CVs have been the subject of both criticism and confusion in their interpretation.' First, the nomenclature "conjectural variation" in itself is confusing because it has been used in the literature and textbooks to describe either Oi, dx, vi (Waterson; Jacquemin), or even 2 (Kamien and Schwartz; Brander and Zhang) . Second, as emphasized by both Bresnahan, and Perloff, the CV should not be interpreted in the same way in a theoretical versus empirical context.
dxj
In theory, ?x represents the "conjecture" of firm i regarding how firm j will react to an increase in quantity by firm i. Empirically, while early work gave a behavioral interpretation to the estimated value of Oi or "conduct parameter," recent practice has been to interpret the conduct parameter as an index of market power that ignores the (unknown) game that firms play (Perloff) .2'3 Finally, Corts demonstrated that Bresnahan's middle ground interpretation of the conduct parameter-firms' behavior is as competitive as if they held the conjecture implied by the estimated value-is valid only under a restrictive condition.4 Nevertheless, validations of the conduct parameter approach using direct measures of marginal cost to compute the "true" value of the conduct parameter have shown that the method performs reasonably well for low levels of market power (Genesove and Mullin; Clay and Troesken 2 The terminology "conduct parameter" has been used generically in the literature to describe the estimated value of either the CV (0,) or the CV elasticity (X M-L). I will use the term "conduct parameter" generically also.
specified for a typical firm, only industry data are available-a common difficulty in this type of analysis. When only industry data are available, Bresnahan argues that the aggregate conduct parameter should be interpreted as the industry average conduct. It is in aggregating the firms' supply relation to obtain an industry average that an error occurs. This error leads to a misspecification of the benchmark values of the industry average CV elasticity against which the estimated parameters are compared to assess the degree of departure from competition and the associated welfare loss. Thus, the interpretation of the results is affected by this mistake.
When firms are not identical (the more general case), aggregating involves weighting each firm's supply relation by its market share and summing across firms (Porter 1983a; Goldberg and Knetter; Wolfram) .5 When there are N identical firms, the market share of each firm is 1/N and aggregating is done by summing the supply relations over all firms and dividing by N (Perloff; Corts). RPA assume N identical firms with the same marginal cost (cq), the same technology (X, the conversion rate of raw potatoes to french fries), behaving according to the same CV (0 defined as in (1) pretation of the conduct parameter to an "a gregate conduct parameter" (Corts, p. 231) .
In fact, the aggregate conduct parameter (0a) can be interpreted as the industry aver age CV elasticity. The CV elasticity (dX x takes the form of 0/N when firms are identic (and Oi = 0 for all i) because each firm has market share equal to 1/N. Table 1 summarizes the values taken by 3L, 0, and Oa under differ ent forms of firm conduct. In a Cournot settin with identical firms, Oa takes the value of 1/N because each firm believes its rivals' quantity i fixed, i.e., dx = 0 and 0 = 1. As shown in the t ble, 0a ranges between 0 (perfect competitio and 1 (perfect collusion) and not between 0 and 2 as claimed by RPA.6 The CV elasticit always ranges between 0 and 1.7
It is important to correctly specify the value taken by the CV elasticity under the forms of conduct listed in table 1 because those values can be used as benchmarks to determine the extent of market power in the industry. For example, when there are five identical firms buying an homogeneous product, an estimated value of Oa greater than 0.2 but less than 1 would imply that the level of market power is greater than that implied by Cournot competition but less than under a joint monopsony 6 RPA cite Brander and Zhang for the bounds of the industry average CV between 0 and 2. However, Brander and Zhang model an airline duopoly where they actually estimate each firm's conjecture (v,). CV (0 as defined in (1)) does vary between 0 and 2 for a duopoly, but not the CV elasticity.
7 More generally, when firms are not identical and do not have the same conjectures, 0a = ,N s,20, where s, is the market share of firm i, 0, is as defined in (1), and s,O, is the general form of the CV elasticity (Porter 1983a; Goldberg and Knetter; Wolfram implications for the interpretation of these estimates of market power.
The authors estimate the conduct parameters in the collusion regime to be 1.038 and 0.861 in the punishment regime. Note that under the authors' derivation of the industry average CV elasticity, 0RPA = 1.038 would be roughly equivalent to Cournot competition in the collusive regime. In contrast, their economic model, following Green and Porter, assumes that firms revert to Cournot competition in the punishment regime. Under the correct interpretation of the industry average CV elasticity, 0a, the estimates of the conduct parameter under both the collusive and punishment regime mean a much higher degree of market power than implied by Cournot competition. Specifically, in collusive periods, Oa = 1.038 m 1.0 indicates that potato processors perfectly collude to maximize their joint profit.
Even in the punishment regime (0a = 0.861), the departure from competition is much larger than predicted by the noncollusive Cournot scenario where 0a = 0.2 when N = 5, the number of major players in the industry according to RPA, and it in fact represents behavior close to a joint monopsony.9 While 0a > 1, under the collusive regime, is not a problem in itself because the estimate is probably not statistically different from one, Porter (1983b) shows "in general the optimal quantity in cooperative periods will exceed that which would maximize expected oint net returns in any single period" (p. 314).1 This logic would imply that the conduct parameter would normally be strictly less than 1, even in collusive regimes.
It is a source of concern that such high degrees of collusion are estimated under both regimes and, consequently, the results do not conform well to the trigger price strategy of collusion put forth by the authors. However, if one believes the estimated conduct parameters, then the estimated degree of departure from competition indicates the presence of a powerful cartel and would likely warrant an antitrust investigation.
The mistake in the definition of the benchmark values of the industry average CV elasticity also has important implications for the interpretation of the magnitude of welfare loss in RPA's table 2.11 Given the extent of departure from competition implied by RPA's results, it is surprising that their estimate of producers' loss due to imperfect competition ($0.369 million/ month) represents only 1.6% of the average shipment value during the sample period (when the supply flexibility (p) is 2.16). This percentage loss in producer surplus (PS) is small relative to the theoretical prediction that can be derived. In deriving the theoretical predictions, I have also found a mistake in equation (RPA18). In what follows, I rederive (RPA18) to develop theoretical predictions for the percentage loss in PS due to oligopsonistic power of potato processors. 8 In collusive periods, the theory provides an expected range for the estimated value of the conduct parameter, i.e., greater than the value expected under the punishment period, but smaller than the value expected under static joint profit maximization (Porter 1983a , Porter 1983b . In punishment periods, the theory provides a specific expected value for the conduct parameter, i.e., the value of the CV elasticity under the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium when price is the strategic variable, or the value of the CV elasticity under the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when quantity is the strategic variable. Price is the strategic variable in Porter's (1983a) model, and he explicitly compares the estimated value of the conduct parameter under cooperation with both the Cournot benchmark and the expected range of this parameter to evaluate the consistency of the results with the conceptual model. 9 It should also be noted that those estimates of CV elasticity are also large in the context of previous empirical research. Sexton and Lavoie's survey of the literature indicates that the measured departures from competition in the food processing industry have mostly been small with CV elasticities often below 0.2. This result is true even in highly concentrated industries such as the meat processing industry where Azzam and Pagoulatos estimated the buyers' CV elasticity to be 0.223. See also table 1 of Sheldon and Sperling, which summarizes market power and Lerner index estimates in the food and related industries.
10 Intuitively, colluding at a quantity higher than the monopsony quantity reduces the incentives to cheat on the agreement. The gains to cheating decrease as the colluding quantity increases for a given trigger price and length of punishment period. and differs from (RPA18) by the factor P.13
Four alternative analytical expressions for the relative loss of producer welfare due to imperfect competition can be derived by dividing the expression for absolute producer loss in equation (3) by the expressions for (a) the competitive PS, (b) the oligopsonist the competitive producer revenue, a oligopsonistic producer revenue. The ical expressions appear in the first r ble 2. All expressions are a function 0a. Thus, they can be evaluated at the value of p (2.16) and under a collusi 1.038) and a punishment (0a = 0.861 Regardless of the measure used, th loss in PS is much larger than 1.6% culated by RPA. I presume that the revenue used by RPA ("the average value of producer shipments") repre oligopsonistic producer revenue. 14 I find that the value of w, implied by the model is much higher than the value of the proxy used by RPA. RPA proxy the competitive price of processing potatoes (w,) by scaling downward the fresh market potato price series by 23% to take into account a conversion ratio of raw to processed potato of 0.5. The average monthly price of fresh potatoes is $4.75/cwt (according to the data provided by RPA), thus the average monthly value of w, is $3.66/cwt. According to the data provided by RPA, the average monthly shipments of processed potatoes is 4.738 million cwt. Presumably, those shipments represent oligopsony quantities (Xm).
Knowing that the quantity determined by oligopsonists is found by equating the perceived marginal outlay expression (2) with marginal value product (we in RPA's setup), we can get an idea of the magnitude of w, implied by the model using the estimated values for p (0.539), p (2.16), and oa under punishment (0.861) and collusion (1.038). Those calculations reveal that the magnitude of wc implied by the model is between $44.37 and $50.31 per cwt, which is more than ten times higher than the values used by RPA ($3.66/cwt on average). Thus, a possible explanation for the low magnitude of welfare loss compared to the theoretical prediction is the difference between the average value of the proxy for wc used by RPA and the value implied by the model at the estimated parameter values.
